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ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM AND THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT 
Robert W. McGee 
ABSTRACT 
Frédéric Bastiat (1801-1850) was a French economist and journalist. 
One of his classic works, The Candlemakers’ Petition, uses the reductio ad 
absurdum philosophical technique to dismantle the arguments the French 
protectionists put forth to protect French industry in the mid-nineteenth 
century. His Petition has been reprinted in numerous college economics 
texts and it has been cited in the scholarly economics literature. 
But Bastiat’s writings on protectionism include much more than his 
Candlemakers’ Petition. This paper discusses The Candlemakers’ Petition 
as a starting point, then explores his other, lesser known writings on 
protectionism and applies his theories to current conditions. 
INTRODUCTION 
Frédéric Bastiat (1801–1850) was a French journalist, economist, and 
pamphleteer. Several authors have written biographies about his life and 
work.1 Mülberger devoted a full volume to his debate with Proudhon about 
the justification for interest.2 
Although not as frequently cited in the economics literature as some 
other economists of the period, his writings have lived on and have stood 
the test of time.3 
Bastiat has penned several works that have been labeled as classics. His 
essay, What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen, proposes a methodology 
economists, political philosophers, and policy makers should use to 
                                                                                                                 
   Florida International University. 
 1. ADOLPHE IMBERT, FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT ET LE SOCIALISME DE SON TEMPS (1913); 
GEORGES DE NOUVION, FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT: SA VIE—SES ŒUVRES—SES DOCTRINES (1905); 
GEORGE C. ROCHE, III, FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT: A MAN ALONE (1971); P. RONCE, FRÉDÉRIC 
BASTIAT: SA VIE, SON ŒUVRE (1905); DEAN RUSSELL, FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT: IDEAS AND 
INFLUENCE (1969). 
 2. ARTHUR MÜLBERGER, KAPITAL UND ZINS: DIE POLEMIK ZWISCHEN BASTIAT UND 
PROUDHON (1896). 
 3. See FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT, THE BASTIAT COLLECTION (2007) [hereinafter THE BASTIAT 
COLLECTION]; FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT, ECONOMIC HARMONIES (W. Hayden Boyers trans., George B. 
de Huszar ed., 4th prtg. 1996) [hereinafter BASTIAT, ECONOMIC HARMONIES]; FRÉDÉRIC 
BASTIAT, ECONOMIC SOPHISMS (Arthur Goddard ed. & trans., 5th prtg. 1996) [hereinafter 
BASTIAT, ECONOMIC SOPHISMS]; Frédéric Bastiat, La Loi [The Law] (first published as a 
pamphlet in 1850), reprinted in ŒUVRES COMPLÈTES DE FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT, TOME QUATRIÈME 
342–93 (3d ed. 1873), reprinted in English in THE BASTIAT COLLECTION, supra, VOL. 1, at 49–94 
(2007) and FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT, THE LAW (Dean Russell trans., 2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter 
BASTIAT, THE LAW]; FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT, SELECTED ESSAYS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY (Seymour 
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examine economic, political, and policy issues.4 In it, he shows that it is 
necessary to examine the effects a policy has on all groups, in both the 
long-run and the short-run. Hazlitt states that the failure to examine the 
effect a policy has on all groups is the main reason so many economic 
theories are faulty.5 At a recent conference on international business and 
public administration, I applied the Bastiat approach to show why much of 
the international relations literature inadequately explains the failure of 
most economic sanctions.6 
Another classic, The Law, discusses and illustrates the difference 
between good law and bad law.7 It addresses the interplay between major 
legal and moral concepts, such as when the laws are used to obtain what 
one could not obtain privately without committing a crime (modern 
economists refer to this as “rent-seeking”8) or when it is used to redistribute 
wealth. It also points out that the reason we have laws is because of 
property, not the other way around.9 His third classic, The Candlemakers’ 
Petition,10 is discussed below. 
Bastiat was an active participant in the free trade debate of the 1840s.11 
He was a friend of Richard Cobden and John Bright—the founders of the 
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British Corn Law League—and engaged in detailed correspondence with 
them.12 
His contributions to the economics literature have been sufficient for 
him to earn a place in Mark Blaug’s Great Economists before Keynes.13 
Robert Heilbroner devotes a major portion of a chapter to Bastiat in his 
classic book The Worldly Philosophers, first published in 1953 and used in 
economics classrooms ever since.14 Rothbard devotes nine pages to Bastiat 
in volume two of his history of economic thought15 and credits Bastiat with 
refuting the Keynesian multiplier theory nearly 100 years before it was 
advanced by Keynes.16 Skousen  spends seven pages discussing Bastiat in 
his history of economic thought.17 Schumpeter referred to him as a “brilliant 
economic journalist.”18 Haney devotes chapter 15 of his History of 
Economic Thought to Bastiat.19 
A number of authors have applied Bastiat’s theories and approaches to 
modern economic problems. Henry Hazlitt, an American economic 
journalist, used Bastiat’s approach to examine a number of economic 
theories and policies in his classic Economics in One Lesson.20 Dean 
Russell, an economist, also applied Bastiat’s theories and approaches to a 
wide range of economic issues.21 
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One defining characteristic of Bastiat was his wit. He deployed the 
reductio ad absurdum technique to highlight the illogic in his opponents’ 
arguments. Nowhere is this approach better illustrated than in his 
Candlemakers’ Petition,22 to which we turn next. 
I. THE CANDLEMAKERS’ PETITION 
The Candlemakers’ Petition, also referred to as The Petition of the 
Candlemakers in some reprints and originally titled Pétition des Fabricants 
de Chandelles, Bougies, Lampes, Chandeliers, Réverbères, Mouchettes, 
Éteignoirs, et des Producteurs de Suif, Huile, Résine, Alcool, et 
Généralement de Tout Ce Qui Concerne L’Éclairage23 [Petition of the 
Manufacturers of Candles, Waxlights, Lamps, Candlesticks, Street Lamps, 
Snuffers, Extinguishers, and of the Producers of Tallow, Oil, Resin, 
Alcohol, and Generally Everything Connected with Lighting],24 has become 
a classic of the free trade literature. It has been reprinted many times in 
economics textbooks and in other trade publications.25 
The Petition was instigated in response to the French Chamber of 
Deputies, which passed legislation that increased duties on all foreign 
products; a measure they thought would benefit French industry.26 It begins 
as follows: 
You are on the right track. You reject abstract theories and have little 
regard for abundance and low prices. You concern yourselves mainly with 
the fate of the producer. You wish to free him from foreign competition, 
that is, to reserve the domestic market for domestic industry. 
We come to offer you a wonderful opportunity for applying your—
what shall we call it? Your theory? No, nothing is more deceptive than 
theory. Your doctrine? Your system? Your principle? But you dislike 
doctrines, you have a horror of systems, and, as for principles, you deny 
that there are any in political economy; therefore we shall call it your 
practice—your practice without theory and without principle.27 
The Petition goes on to complain about the suffering French producers 
are incurring as a result of a foreign competitor “who . . . works under 
conditions [that are] so far superior to” those of the French manufacturers 
that they are unable to compete.28 This competitor is flooding the French 
market with light at such an “incredibly low price” that French producers of 
light such as candle makers, makers of lanterns, street lamps, and the 
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secondary industries that support those industries—such as the producers of 
oil, tallow, resin, alcohol and extinguishers—are threatened with stagnation 
if not total destruction.29 
This foreign competitor, of course, is the sun. Bastiat’s Petition asks the 
French legislature to pass a law requiring everyone to close their windows, 
sky lights, dormers, inside and outside shutters, curtains and anything else 
that allows light to enter.30 
He goes on to explain the benefits of passing such a law. Shutting off as 
much natural light as possible creates a need for artificial light, which 
would encourage a wide range of French industry.31 In order to consume 
more tallow it would be necessary to have more cattle and sheep, which 
would require more cleared fields, leather, wool, meat and manure, which is 
the basis of all French agricultural wealth.32 
But that is not the end of the story. If the French consume more oil it 
would be necessary to expand cultivation of several agricultural products, 
including the olive, rapeseed and the poppy.33 The fact that these plants 
exhaust the soil would not be a problem because the increased breeding of 
cattle would result in the production of more manure to fertilize the fields 
where these items are being grown.34 
French moors would be “covered with resinous trees.”35 French 
mountains would be swarming with bees.36 All sectors of agriculture would 
vastly expand. 
The shipping industry would also expand.37 Thousands of French 
vessels would be employed by the whaling industry, to the glory of France. 
The Parisian manufacturing sector would also prosper. One would soon see 
gilding, bronze and crystal in lamps, candle sticks, chandeliers and 
candelabra. There will not be a resin collector or miner who will not enjoy 
increased wages and prosperity. There is not one Frenchman, from the 
wealthy stockbroker to the humblest match vendor whose condition would 
not be improved by outlawing the sun. 
Bastiat goes on to address the objections that the French Chamber of 
Deputies might raise and responds to them. One might object that, although 
French industry may benefit from protectionism, France itself will not 
benefit because consumers will have to pay. Bastiat answers: 
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You no longer have the right to invoke the interests of the consumer. 
You have sacrificed him whenever you have found his interests opposed 
to those of the producer. You have done so in order to encourage industry 
and to increase employment. For the same reason you ought to do so this 
time too.38 
Bastiat points out that when the argument was made that consumers 
have a stake in the free importation of iron, coal, sesame, wheat and 
textiles, the Chamber of Deputies responded that French producers have a 
stake in their exclusion. Likewise, if they raise the objection that French 
consumers have a stake in the admission of natural light, producers have a 
stake in preventing consumers from obtaining it for free. 
Free traders might also assert that the producer and the consumer are 
the same person. If manufacturers benefit from the protection, they will 
cause farmers to also benefit. The protection will open markets for 
manufactured goods. If the Chamber of Deputies would grant a daytime 
monopoly over the production of light, “large amounts of tallow, charcoal, 
resin, wax, alcohol, silver, iron, bronze, and crystal,”39 would be purchased, 
making those industries rich. They will consume the products of all other 
French industries, causing a ripple effect throughout the French economy. 
He then raises another free market argument. “[S]un[light] is a 
gratuitous gift of [n]ature.”40 Rejecting such a gift “would be to reject 
wealth itself under the pretext of encouraging [production].”41 He then 
points out that if the Chamber of Deputies takes that position they “strike a 
mortal blow at [their] own policy.”42 On previous occasions the French 
Chamber of Deputies argued in favor of excluding foreign goods “because 
and in proportion as they approximate gratuitous gifts.”43 
Labor and nature combine to produce various commodities.44 The 
relative proportion of labor and nature depend on the country and the 
climate. The portion provided by nature is free. It is only the labor 
component that we must pay for. “Thus, when an orange [arrives] . . . from 
Portugal, [it can be said that it is given to the French nation] half free of 
charge, or . . . at half price . . . compared [to oranges] from Paris.”45 
It is precisely on the basis that the product is half free that protectionists 
argue it should be barred. That being the case, how can it be argued that a 
totally free product should be admitted into competition? Such an argument 
involves inconsistency. If something that is half free is harmful to French 
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domestic industry, one must exclude something that is totally free with 
twice the zeal. 
Bastiat then gives another example. When a product such as iron, coal, 
wheat or textiles comes from abroad, enabling French consumers to obtain 
it for less labor than if it were produced domestically, the difference is a 
gratuitous gift. The size of the gift is in direct proportion to the difference in 
cost. The gift is as complete as it can be when the donor – the sun – 
provides us with light and asks for nothing in return. 
The question Bastiat then poses is whether what they desire for France 
is the benefit to be gained by this free consumption or the alleged 
advantages of onerous production. He instructs them to make their choice 
but to be logical. Since they ban foreign iron, coal, wheat and textiles in 
proportion as their price approaches zero, it would be utterly inconsistent to 
admit sunlight, which has a price of zero all day long. 
The point Bastiat was trying to make is that the arguments the Chamber 
of Deputies had used in the past to justify protection for other commodities 
were absurd when taken to their logical conclusions. Outlawing the sun, to 
the extent possible, would be a stupid and irrational policy, since the sun 
costs nothing and all of France benefits. What is less obvious is that foreign 
products that cost less than French products constitute partial gifts to the 
French people. 
Bastiat uses another approach in his essay, What Is Seen and What Is 
Not Seen,46 to make the same point. He argues that what is seen by 
protecting a wide range of French industry from competition by the sun is 
an increase in sales for candle makers and other industries that are involved 
in the artificial light industry, but what is not seen is all the business that 
never takes place in other industries because French consumers now have to 
pay for something that was formerly free. If consumers must pay more for 
light products, they will have less to spend on every other industry and 
service. All the non-light industries and service providers will suffer as a 
result of protecting the French artificial lighting industry. 
As was mentioned, Bastiat was a vigorous advocate of free trade. He 
wanted to do for France what Cobden and Bright were doing for England, 
namely, abolishing restrictions to trade.47 Two tools in his toolbox were 
ridicule and reductio ad absurdum. He also employed logic, utilitarian 
analysis, and, at times, rights theory to make his point. We now turn to 
some of his other writings on free trade. 
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II. DIFFERENTIAL TARIFFS 
In a short essay on differential tariffs, Bastiat illustrates the effect such 
tariffs have on the common man.48 In the example, an impoverished French 
farmer who lovingly tended his vines finally raises enough grapes to make a 
cask of wine, which he takes to the nearest town, telling his wife that he 
will use the proceeds from the sale to purchase enough material for her “‘to 
furnish a trousseau for our daughter.’”49 
When he arrives he meets a Belgian and an Englishman. The Belgian 
offers to give him fifteen parcels of yarn for his wine. The Englishman 
offers him twenty parcels, explaining that the reason he can offer more is 
because the English spin at lower cost than the Belgians.50 
Before he can make the trade, a customs officer who was there said: 
“‘My good man, trade with the Belgian, if you wish, but my orders are to 
keep you from trading with the Englishman.’”51 
“‘What?’” the farmer exclaimed. “‘You want me to be content with 
fifteen parcels of yarn from Brussels, when I could have twenty from 
Manchester?’”52 
The customs official replied, “‘Certainly; do you not see that France 
would lose if you received twenty parcels instead of fifteen?’”53 
The farmer found that result difficult to understand. The customs 
official replied that he found it difficult to explain, stating only that “‘it is a 
fact; for all our deputies, cabinet ministers, and journalists agree that the 
more a nation receives in exchange for a given quantity of its products, the 
poorer it becomes.’”54 
Because of this policy the farmer had to be content dealing with the 
Belgian. As a result, his daughter got only three-fourths of a trousseau and 
the farmer’s family is still trying to figure out how a person can be ruined 
by receiving four parcels of yarn instead of three, and why a person is richer 
with three dozen towels than with four dozen. 
Bastiat’s example makes obvious what politicians and some economists 
try to obscure: that consumers are better off if they are not prevented from 
trading with whomever they want. Protectionists would argue that tariffs or 
outright bans on imports are necessary to protect French industry. But in 
this case there was no Frenchman present other than the farmer. There were 
two losers in this exchange, the Frenchman and the Englishman, and only 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Frédéric Bastiat, Droits Différentiels, reprinted in ŒUVRES COMPLÈTES DE FRÉDÉRIC 
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one winner, the Belgian. Since the losers exceed the winners, the result is 
what economists would call a negative-sum game. Utilitarians would call it 
an unethical policy, since utilitarian ethics treats positive-sum games as 
ethical and negative-sum games as unethical.55 Rights theorists would 
consider the policy of imposing tariffs unethical because it violates contract 
and property rights.56 
One might counter that the transaction is positive-sum, since all trade is 
a positive-sum game. Both parties are better off after than before the trade. 
Otherwise they would not have entered into the trade. That is perfectly true. 
Both the farmer and the Belgian are better off as a result of the trade. But 
the farmer is not as well off as he would have been in the absence of the 
legal restriction. 
Which argument wins depends on how you define negative-sum game, 
and this is one of the problems with economic analysis. The definition 
sometimes determines the conclusion. Under Bastiat’s definition, the 
Englishman was a loser, although he was not a party to the transaction. He 
would have been a winner if the transaction had been allowed to take place. 
III. UTILITARIAN AND RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES 
Regardless of how one might consider the outcome of the French 
farmer and Belgian merchant example from a utilitarian perspective, the 
outcome from a rights perspective is clear. Someone’s rights have been 
violated; therefore, the policy is unethical. 
The utilitarian and rights perspectives might be summarized by the 
following two flowcharts: 
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According to utilitarian ethics, an act or policy is ethical if the result is 
more winners than losers, or if the result is a positive-sum game, which is 
not quite the same thing. Early utilitarians57 stated that an act or policy is 
good if the result is the greatest good for the greatest number, a condition 
that is impossible to achieve, since it is not possible to maximize two 
variables at the same time.58 
With respect to Bastiat’s French farmer, one might conclude that the 
transaction meets the utilitarian ethics test because both parties to the 
transaction—the French farmer and the Belgian merchant—are better off as 
a result of the trade. While it may be argued that the Englishman has lost as 
a result of the trade, he is, in fact, in exactly the same position as he was 
before the trade. Before the transaction, he had twenty parcels and after it 
he has the same twenty parcels, although his rights have been violated by 
being prevented from entering into the trade. 
But the French farmer is not as well off as he would have been if he had 
been allowed to trade with the Englishman instead of the Belgian. 
Utilitarian ethics has a problem dealing with this kind of fact situation, but 
it is not a totally insurmountable one. A more sophisticated approach would 
be to take the position that “an action is right if and only if it brings about at 
least as much net happiness as any other action the agent could have 
performed; otherwise it is wrong.”59 In other words, even if the outcome is 
positive, it is unethical unless it is the most positive of all possible 
outcomes. 
Under this more holistic utilitarian perspective, the fact that the trade 
restriction leads to a suboptimal result makes it wrong. Bastiat’s example 
illustrates this point without coming right out and saying it. 
The second flowchart illustrates the rights position. According to this 
view an act or policy is inherently unethical or unjust if someone’s rights 
are violated by it, even if the winners’ gains exceed the losers’ losses. For 
example, if two wolves and one sheep were to take a vote on what to have 
for lunch, a utilitarian would conclude that voting to eat the sheep was an 
ethical act because the winners exceeded the losers, whereas a rights 
theorist would conclude the act was unethical because the rights of the 
sheep were violated. The fact that some majority benefited is totally 
irrelevant. 
One of the inherent flaws in utilitarian ethics is that it ignores rights. 
Bentham, one of the early utilitarians, would disagree, since he believes that 
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there is no such thing as inherent rights,60 but we will leave discussion of 
this issue for another day. 
Bastiat addressed trade issues from a predominantly utilitarian point of 
view. His arguments are utilitarian in the sense that he consistently argues 
that free trade results in more winners than losers and that society benefits 
from free trade. But his philosophical outlook was not limited to utility. He 
was also, at times, a rights theorist. The most complete exposition of his 
rights position was laid out in The Law.61 In it, Bastiat describes how the 
law can be perverted into a tool of legal plunder. “Under the pretense of 
organization, regulation, protection, or encouragement,” Bastiat writes, “the 
law takes property from one person and gives it to another; the law takes 
the wealth of all and gives it to a few—whether farmers, manufacturers, 
shipowners, artists, or comedians.”62 
Some economists call this practice rent-seeking, or using the law to 
feather the nests of the few (special interests) at the expense of the many.63 
But how is this legal plunder to be identified? Quite simply. See if the 
law takes from some persons what belongs to them, and gives it to other 
persons to whom it does not belong. See if the law benefits one citizen at 
the expense of another by doing what the citizen himself cannot do 
without committing a crime. 
Then abolish this law without delay, for it is not only an evil itself, 
but also it is a fertile source for further evils because it invites reprisals. If 
such a law—which may be an isolated case—is not abolished 
immediately, it will spread, multiply, and develop into a system.64 
Bastiat applied this view in the following trade example. 
                                                                                                                 
 60. BENTHAM, supra note 57; NONSENSE UPON STILTS: BENTHAM, BURKE AND MARX ON THE 
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these functions are unjust because they use the force of government to redistribute wealth. Id. 
 61. BASTIAT, THE LAW, supra note 3. 
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SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 3, at 229–39, and The Physiology of Plunder, reprinted in 
BASTIAT, ECONOMIC SOPHISMS, supra note 3, at 129–46. 
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SEEKING: CHRONICLE OF AN INTELLECTUAL QUAGMIRE (Alan Lockard & Gordon Tullock eds., 
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 64. BASTIAT, THE LAW, supra note 3, at 17. 
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IV. RESTRAINT OF TRADE 
In his essay, What is Seen and What Is Not Seen,65 Bastiat discusses the 
case of an industrialist—whom he calls Mr. Protectionist—who “devote[s] 
his time and . . . capital to converting ore from his [property] into iron.”66 
However, because nature has blessed Belgium with more natural ore than 
France, the Belgians are able to sell their iron for a lower price.67 This gift 
from nature meant that Frenchmen in various industries such as 
“nailmakers, metalworkers, cartwrights, mechanics, blacksmiths, and 
plowmen” are prompted by their self-interest to buy their iron from 
Flanders rather than from domestic suppliers like Mr. Protectionist.68  
“His first [thought] was to stop this abuse . . . with his own two 
hands.”69 He would take his carbine, four pistols, cartridges, and a sword to 
the border and kill the first French tradesman he sees who attempts to buy 
this cheap Belgian iron.70 It would teach them a lesson. How dare they put 
their own self-interest above that of Mr. Protectionist? 
But as he began to leave he started having second thoughts.71 Perhaps 
some of his countrymen might not allow themselves to be killed.72 They 
might kill him instead.73 Even if he took all his servants with him, they 
would not be able to guard the entire border.74 Furthermore, the cost of 
trying to stop this trade would cost more than his entire net worth.75 
Just as he was becoming resigned to the fact that he must settle for 
being free like everyone else “he had a brilliant idea.”76 “He remembered 
that there is a great law factory in Paris” that made laws everyone must 
conform to “whether . . . good or bad.”77 Police are paid to enforce these 
laws out of the national wealth.78 Perhaps he could get this Parisian factory 
to make “a nice . . . law [stating that] ‘Belgian iron is prohibited.’”79 Rather 
than incurring the cost of sending his few servants to the border, the State 
could send 20,000 sons of those tradesmen who were buying Belgian iron 
to act as customs officials, to be paid with the taxes extracted from those 
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very same tradesmen.80 It would cost Mr. Protectionist nothing; he would 
be protected from the brutality that might be inflicted on him if he were to 
try to do the job himself; and it would enable him to sell the iron at his 
price.81 He would also have “the sweet pleasure of seeing . . . [the] people 
shamefully hoaxed.”82 
So he went to members of the legislature and  
presented to their excellencies the following argument:  “Belgian iron is 
sold in France at ten francs, which forces me to sell mine at the same 
price. I should prefer to sell it at fifteen and cannot because of this 
confounded Belgian iron. Manufacture a law that says: ‘Belgian iron shall 
no longer enter France.’ Immediately I shall raise my price by five francs, 
with the following consequences:  
“. . . I shall enrich myself more quickly; I shall employ more men. . . . My 
employees and I will spend more, to the great advantage of our suppliers 
for miles around. These suppliers, having a greater market, will give more 
orders to industry, and gradually this activity will spread throughout the 
country. This lucky hundred-sou piece that you will drop into my coffers, 
like a stone that is thrown into a lake will cause an infinite number of 
concentric circles to radiate great distances in every direction.”83 
His argument was an early example of the Keynesian multiplier, of 
course.84 Some funds injected into one part of the economy will have a 
ripple effect throughout all parts of the economy, having a multiplier effect. 
The legislators, seeing “that it is so easy to increase the wealth of a 
people simply by legislation,” decided to pass the law.85 After all, why 
bother to work and save when you can easily create wealth by legislative 
fiat?86 
In fact, the law did everything Mr. Protectionist said it would do. 
Unfortunately, it had other effects as well. What is seen is the prosperity of 
Mr. Protectionist and the people who work for him. What is not seen are the 
negative secondary effects that offset the gains of Mr. Protectionist and his 
workers. 
The scenario Mr. Protectionist presented to the members of the 
legislature was incomplete. There are more people affected than merely 
himself and his workers. While it is true that the extra five francs are 
channeled into the pockets of Mr. Protectionist, which benefits himself and 
his workers, the extra five francs “did not come down from the moon; [it 
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came] from the pocket of a metalworker, a nailmaker, a cartwright, a 
blacksmith, a plowman,”87 and other individuals who use iron in their 
businesses. Mr. Protectionist’s profit is “counterbalanced” by the losses of 
these other groups.88 Any encouragement of industry that Mr. Protectionist 
could have done by spending his five extra francs could have equally been 
done by those metalworkers and nailmakers. “The stone is thrown in at one 
point in the lake only because it has been prohibited by law from being 
thrown in at another.”89 
“[W]hat is not seen [offsets] what is seen . . . .”90 The result “is an 
injustice [that is made worse by the fact that it was] perpetrated by the 
law.”91 But that is not the end of the story. There is a third person, lurking 
“in the shadow[s]” who cannot be seen who has also lost five francs.92 So 
there are two losers, not merely one. 
These tradesmen who now have to pay fifteen francs for their iron have 
five francs less to spend on other things. Before the law was passed, they 
could buy the iron they needed and still have five francs left to buy other 
things.93 After the law is passed they have only enough to buy the iron.94 
They cannot use it to buy some other manufacture, or perhaps a book.95 
There is another moral to the story aside from the fact that 
protectionism results in a negative-sum game, or what Bastiat calls a “dead 
loss.”96 It is the lesson Bastiat teaches in The Law. “There are people who 
think that plunder loses all its immorality as soon as it becomes legal.”97 
But it does not. Mr. Protectionist has used the law to do what he could not 
do without committing a crime. He cannot stop Belgian iron sellers at the 
border with guns and he cannot prevent his fellow Frenchmen from buying 
Belgian iron by using force without committing a crime. But he can use the 
law to do it for him. Thus, for Bastiat, the law is “perverted.”98 
V. ANTIDUMPING—A MODERN EXAMPLE 
Protectionism involves both winners and losers. The winners are 
domestic producers, who stand to gain because foreign producers are 
prevented from selling their products on domestic markets at a price they 
would otherwise charge. Tariffs on the importation of foreign products raise 
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the price of those products, making them less competitive and making it 
easier for domestic producers to keep their prices at a higher level than 
would be possible in a free market, where foreign producers are able to 
compete on price. But there are also losers. The losers consist of just about 
everyone else, since protectionism causes prices to rise above the market 
price and causes some products to be totally unavailable, which forces 
consumers to be content with their second or third choice rather than their 
first choice. 
While one might argue that tariff rates have come down since 1999—
which is partly true—not all tariff rates have come down. As tariffs have 
been reduced, domestic producers have shifted their attention to 
antidumping law—a different kind of protectionist tariff—which they have 
found to be a very effective tool to thwart foreign competition.99 
Antidumping laws100 serve the same purpose today as they did in 
Bastiat’s time. Such laws have been in existence in the U.S. since World 
War I, if not earlier. They punish foreign producers for selling their 
products on domestic markets for less than the cost of production or for a 
lower price than what they charge in their home markets. You might ask, 
“Why would anyone care?” After all, low prices are good for consumers, 
and in the case of steel and chemicals and other products that domestic 
producers purchase to turn into finished products—like automobiles—
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allowing such a practice also benefits domestic producers. Lower steel 
prices for auto makers means lower costs for automakers, which translates 
into lower consumer prices for cars and higher profits for domestic auto 
manufacturers. Lower costs of production also make domestic auto makers 
more competitive in international markets. 
Antidumping laws, protect special interests101 at the expense of the vast 
majority. They actually obstruct trade rather than foster it.102 There may be 
legitimate and rational reasons for dumping a product on the market. For 
example, it makes sense for a flower monger to sell wilted flowers for 
whatever price they can get, since the alternative is not selling them at all.103 
Furthermore, the microeconomic theory of discriminatory pricing actually 
justifies the practice of selling the same product for different prices in 
different markets as a way to increase sales and profits.104 This is the reason 
movie theaters give senior citizen discounts and restaurants give discounts 
to people who arrive for dinner before the normal rush hour. It is a perfectly 
acceptable practice when movie theaters and restaurants engage in 
discriminatory pricing but illegal when foreign producers do it.105 
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No one’s rights are violated by dumping. From a utilitarian perspective, 
voluntary trade is an ethical act because there are two winners and no 
losers. Trade is not a zero-sum game where one party’s gain is exactly 
offset by another party’s loss.106 
A number of studies have attempted to estimate the cost of various 
protectionist measures such as antidumping laws. Messerlin107 did a 
massive study of the cost of protectionism in Europe. He computed the 
costs of tariffs and other nontariff barriers in a wide range of industries for 
1990, 1995, and 1999, and stated that the 1999 levels would likely not 
change until at least 2005.108 For 1999 the overall rate of protection for all 
industries included in the study was 11.7 percent.109 The average tariff rate 
was 7.0 percent and antidumping charges, which act like tariffs, averaged 
22.4 percent,110 making many target companies uncompetitive, since very 
few companies in competitive industries can afford to raise their prices by 
22.4 percent and still compete against domestic producers. 
Messerlin’s study also demonstrated that the cost of antidumping laws 
varies by industry. Some industries are targeted more than others. Overall, 
antidumping rates averaged 17.5 percent in 1990, 21.8 percent in 1995 and 
22.4 percent in 1999,111 but the rates for some industries were much higher 
than the average. For leather and leather products the 1999 rate was 27.9 
percent; for petroleum and coal products it was 30.0 percent; for radio, TV 
and communication it was 37.7 percent.112 Fifteen of the twenty-two sectors 
in the Messerlin study had an overall protection rate of more than 30 
percent; 19 of the sectors had an overall protection rate of over 15 
percent.113 Foreign producers find it very difficult to make a profit with 
such high penalties, which makes it possible for domestic producers to raise 
their prices without fear of rigorous price competition. 
Studies similar to the Messerlin European study have been conducted 
for China,114 Korea,115 and the United States.116 The findings in those 
studies were similar to those of Messerlin. These studies all strongly 
suggest that trade barriers increase costs to consumers while reducing 
efficiency and welfare. 
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Dean et al. estimated the price effects of non-tariff trade barriers for 
forty-seven consumer products grouped into four categories for more than 
sixty countries.117 They found that non-tariff trade barriers often caused 
significant increases in consumer prices. Table 1 summarizes their findings. 
Table 1: Price Rises in Consumer Products118 
as a Result of Non-Tariff Trade Barriers 
Product Group Range of Price  
Increases (%) 
Mean Increase (%) 
Fruits & vegetables 2-61 44 
Bovine meat 2-90 54 
Processed food 34-53 41 
Apparel 8-97 50 
 
Non-tariff trade barriers increased the price of fruits and vegetables by 
an average of 44 percent, with a range of 2–61 percent. The average for 
bovine meat was 54 percent, with a range of 2–90 percent. The category of 
processed food had the lowest average price increase, 41 percent, although 
none of the countries included in the study had price increases of less than 
34 percent. Apparel prices increased by an average of 50 percent as a result 
of non-tariff trade barriers, with a range of 8–97 percent. Since consumers 
have to pay more for food products, they have less to spend on other things, 
like autos, vacations, entertainment, education and a wide range of other 
products and services. 
The conclusion is that using protectionist measures to save jobs or 
protect domestic industry results in an inefficient allocation of resources. It 
would be far cheaper simply to pay people three or six months worth of 
salary and let them find a new job.119 
An argument penned by Bastiat in his Candlemakers’ Petition,120 
discussed above, may be one of the best arguments against antidumping 
measures. The gist of his argument is that it is in the best interest of those 
on the receiving end of this gift of low prices to accept this gift. Doing so 
would free up assets that would otherwise be used to purchase the product 
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(illumination, in Bastiat’s example) to purchase other things, thus 
increasing the standard of living for the vast majority. 
His argument was utilitarian, of course, since the underlying premise is 
that the vast majority benefit,121 what modern economists call a positive-
sum game. But the real issue is one of rights. Do individuals have the right 
to exchange what they have for what they want or don’t they, and if not, 
why not? One cannot use a public policy argument to justify preventing free 
trade, since free trade benefits the vast majority,122 albeit at the expense of 
the special interests. 
Bastiat discussed this perversion of definitions. Those who would 
justify protectionism on the basis of promoting the general welfare would 
include plunder in the definition of the general welfare, which is in conflict 
with the definition of justice.123 For Bastiat, justice exists when the 
government confines itself to the protection of life, liberty and property. 
When it goes beyond these basic functions it engages in redistribution. It 
takes property from those who are entitled to it and gives it to those who are 
not entitled to it. The result is injustice.124 
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